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JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
and

Peter A. Joy
Staff Attorney, Clinical Program
Case Western Reserve University
Joinder and severance issues may arise from either
(1) the joinder of offenses allegedly committed by
one defendant or (2) the joinder of defendants. The
importance of joinder cannot be overestimated. As
one commentator has noted: "The way in which the
prosecutor chooses to combine offenses or defendants in a single indictment is perhaps second in importance only to his decision to prosecute. Whether a
defendant is tried en masse with many other participants in an alleged crime, or in a separate trial of his
own, will often be decisive of the outcome. Equally
decisive may be the number of offenses which are cu. mulated against a single defendant, particularly if
they are unconnected." 8 Moore's Federal Practice
8-3 ( R. Cipes ed. 1979).
In Ohio joinder and severance are governed by the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8 covers the joinder of offenses and defendants in one indictment, information, or complaint. Rule 13 governs the consolidation for trial of offenses and defendants in situations in which there is more than one indictment, information, or complaint. Finally, Rule 14 governs severance of offenses and defendants.
This article examines the joinder and severance of
offenses and defendants. Some issues, however, are
common to both types of joinder and are discussed in
the following section.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The Relationship Between the Ohio and Federal Rules
The joinder and severance rules found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are, in many respects,
identical to the Ohio Rules. Thus, it is not surprising
that federal cases would provide interpretive guidance
for issues arising under the Ohio Rules. See State v.
Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 145,366 N.E.2d 1367,
1375 (1975) ("[T] he construction of Fed. R. Grim.
P. 14 by the federal courts is of help in this case.").

There are, however, several important differences between the Ohio and Federal Rules that should not be
ignored. In State v. Durham, 49 Ohio App.2d 231,
360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), for example, the court emphasized that the decision to grant a severance "rests
in the sound discretion of the [trial] court" and
"[u] nless the discretion has been exercised to the
manifest injury of the accused, there is no· error." /d.
at 233, 360 N.E.2d at 746. This statement overlooks
the explicit language of Rule 14, which specifies that
once prejudice has been found, "the court shalf order
an election or separate trial of counts, grant severance
of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires" (emphasis added). In contrast, Federal Rule
14 provides that the court may sever in the case of
prejudice. The drafters of the Ohio Rules clearly
made a conscious choice to limit the trial court's discretion once prejudice has been established. See State
v. Owen, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 145,366 N.E. 2d
1367, 1375 (1975) ("[W] hile the federal courts have
discretion in granting severance, our rule provides that
if prejudice is shown 'the court shall order' severance."); 2 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal
Law 183 ( 1974) ("By the use of the word may the
federal courts are permitted to balance the possible
prejudice to the defendant against convenience, while
the use of the word shall requires Ohio courts to provide relief whenever prejudice is demonstrated.").
The decision to make Rule 14 a mandatory rather
than a permissive provision probably resulted from
criticism of the federal courts' reluctance to grant severance liberally under the federal rule. See 8 Moore's
Federal Practice and Procedure 8-4 ( R. Cipes ed.
1979) ("Rule 14 is available, but such availability
tends to be more theoretical than real."); 1 C. Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure 305 ( 1969) ("Given
the evident reluctance of trial and appellate courts to
grant separate trials under Rule 14, a broad interpretation of Rule 8 means broad joinder, whether or not
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this is just or fair."). Federal authorities, therefore,
cannot be employed in an unthinking fashion; the
Ohio Rule was designed to overrule some of these authorities.

366 N.E.2d at 1376. This statement is troublesome
for several reasons. First, the
court cited federal authorities to support its position. Its citations,
however, were selective. The federal courts have not
followed a uniform rule on the waiver issue. Indeed,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer v. U.S., 362 U.S.
511 (1960), spoke of the trial judge's "continuing duty
at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear." !d. at 516. See also 8 Moore's
Federal Practice 14-11 to -19 (R. Cipes ed. 1979).
Second, Rule 12(8)(5) requires severance motions under Rule 14 to be made prior to trial. Motions not
made prior to trial are waived under subsection (G) of
Rule 12: Therefore, the waiver issue is explicitly covered in the Rules and the Rules do not require that
the motion be renewed during trial. Nevertheless, a
prudent attorney should renew the motion to avoid
any problem.

Owens

The Relationship Between Rules 8 and 14
An appreciation of the relationship between Rules
8 and 14 is fundamental to an understanding of joinder and severance. Severance under Rule 14 requires
a showing of prejudice. That provision, however, is
only operable in the case of a proper joinder under
Rule 8. If the joinder is improper (misjoinder), then
severance is automatic, prejudice need not be shown.
Both of the major commentators on the Federal Rules
agree on this point. Professor Wright has written:
"[Motions for misjoinder] raise only a question of law.
If there has been misjoinder, the trial court has no discretion to deny the motion, and the appellate court
may not consider the failure to do so harmless error."
1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 337
(1969). See also id. at 432 ("Rule 14 comes into play
only if the original joinder was proper. It permits a
severance, despite the propriety of the original joinder,
if needed to avoid prejudice."). Similarly, Professor
Moore's treatise contains the following passage: "[A]
pleading which fails to comply with the minimum
standards of joinder should be treated as conclusively
prejudicial. This means that where the trial judge determines that offenses or defendants have been misjoined, he has no discretion to deny relief." 8 Moore's
Federal Practice 8-14 (R. Cipes ed. 1979). See U.S. v.
Piacente, 490 F.2d 661,665 (7th Cir. 1973) ("When
joinder is improper, severance is the appropriate remedy and there is no discretion in the court's ruling.")
This point was ignored in State v. Durham, 49 Ohio
App.2d 231,360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), in which the
court stated: "Where an indictment charges two or
more distinct offenses, even if improperly joined, the
exercise of authority to compel the prosecutor to make
an election [or grant a severance] rests in the sound
discretion of the court, to be exercised in the promotion of justice and upon good cause shown .... " !d.
at 233,360 N.E.2d at 746 (emphasis added). This passage is dictum because the two counts in Durham-aggravated burglary and theft-were properly joined under Rule 8(A) since both offenses were ;'based on the
same act or transactions."
Durham illustrates the necessity for counsel to inform the court of the precise basis for a motion to sever. If there is a misjoinder, of either offenses or defendants, a motion to sever shoul.d specify that Rule 8,
rather than Rule 14, is the basis of the motion. Otherwise, counsel may be required to establish prejudice as
specified in Rule 14. Motions for severance based on
misjoinder are made pursuant to Rule 12(B) (2); motions for severance based on prejudicial joinder are
made pursuant to Rule 12(8)(5).

Proof in Support of a Motion to Sever
When making a motion to sever, counsel should
specify the grounds on which the motion is based and
introduce evidence or make an offer of proof in support of the motion. A mere allegation of prejudice
will not be sufficient. Two pre-Rules cases address
this issue. In State v. Perod, 15 Ohio App.2d 115, 239
N.E.2d 100 (1968), the court overruled a motionto
sever, stating: "The record shows a request by motion
for a separate trial but a total failure to show cause."
/d. at 122, 239 N.E.2d at 105. In State v. Fields, 29
Ohio App.2d 154,279 N.E.2d 616 (1971), the court
adopted a somewhat different position. According to
that court, good cause may be shown "in any manner
consistent with proof of motions generally, including
a showing by the professional statement of counsel."
/d. at 158,279 N.E.2d at 619 (emphasis added). Examples of severance motions and supporting memoranda are found in 9 G. Messerman, Ohio Forms of
Pleading and Practice, Criminal Rules ( 1979).
JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES
Rule 8(A) provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment, information or complaint in a separate count
for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies
or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are
based on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan, or part of a course of criminal conduct.

Duplicity, Multiplicity, and Crimes of Similar Import
S~ction 8(A) prohibits the misjoinder of offensesthe unauthorized charging of unrelated offenses in an
indictment. This section also prohibits duplicitous
charging-charging two offenses in the same count of
an indictment. A related problem is known as multiplicitous charging. Multiplicity is the opposite of duplicity; it is the charging of a single crime in multiple
counts. While the problems of duplicity and multiplicity are beyond the scope of this article, it should
be noted that the Ohio Multiple Counts Statute, R.C.
2941.25, which provides that a defendant can be convicted of only one offense if charged with "two or

Waiver
In State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 366 N.E.
2d 1367 ( 1975), the court stated: "[T] he motion to
sever was made before trial. It was not renewed either
after the state rested or at the conclusion of all of the
evidence. When not renewed, it is waived." !d. at 146,
2

joinder of offenses.

more allied offenses of similar import" based on the
same conduct, is directed at a related problem-the
prevention of multiple convictions for a single transaction. See State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St.2d 224, 364
N.E.2d 224 (1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 911 (1978);
State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St.2d 135,359 N.E.2d 78
(1976); Maumee v. Geiger, 45 Ohio St. 2d 238,344
N.E.2d 133 (1976); State v. Fisher, 52 Ohio App.2d
133, 368 N.E.2d 324 (1977).

The argument against joinder is that the defendant may
be prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons:
( 1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is
found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or
(3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various
crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible but perhaps equally persuasive element of prejudice may reside in a latent
feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of several
crimes as distinct from only one. ld at 88.

Misjoinder of Offenses
The most troublesome aspect of joinder under Rule
8(A) concerns joinder of offenses "of the same or similar character," which are not part of a single scheme
or plan. This is because the rationale underlying the
joinder of offenses-"avoiding duplicitous, timeconsuming trials in which the same factual and legal
issues must be litigated"-is not applicable in this instance. ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 29 (1968). "[S] ince the offenses on trial are
distinct, trial of each is likely to require its own evidence and witnesses. The time spent where similar
offenses are joined may not be as long as two trials,
but the time saved by impaneTiing only one jury and
by setting the defendant's background only once seems
minimal." Note, joint and Single Trials Under Rules
8 and 74 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
74 Yale L.J. 553, 560 (1965). While the Rule permits
joinder of the same or similar offenses, the absence of
strong policy reasons for this type of joinder should
be considered by a court in ruling on a motion to sever offenses because of prejudice under Rule 14. See
ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance §
2.2(a) (1968) (providing for severance as a matter of
right when the same or similar offenses are joined).

See also McElroy v. U.S., 164 U.S. 76,80 (1896)
("[T] he multiplication of distinct charges has been
considered so objectionable as tending to confound
the accused in his defense, or to prejudice him as to
his challenges, in the matter of being held out to be habitually criminal, in the distraction of the attention of
the jury, or otherwise, that it is the settled rule in England and in many of our States, to confine the indictment to one distinct offense or restrict the evidence to
one transaction.").
The first type of prejudice is illustrated by Cross v.
U.S., 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in which the defendant was charged with two counts of robbery. Prior to trial the defendant moved to sever the two offenses so that he could testify on one count but not
the other. The denial of the motion was held to be reversible error.
If he testifies on one count, he runs the risk that any adverse effects will influence the jury's consideration of the
other count. Thus he bears the risk on both counts, although he may benefit on only one. Moreover, a defendant's silence on one count would be damaging in the face
of this express denial of the other. Thus he may be co-·erced into testifying on the count upon which he wished
to remain silent. It is not necessary to decide whether
this invades his constitutional right to remain silent, since
we think it constitutes prejudice within the meaning of
Rule 14. /d. at 989.

Prejudicial Joinder
If offenses are properly joined pursuant to Rule
8(A), the defendant may nonetheless seek a severance
pursuant to Rule 14. If prejudice is established, the
court must grant the motion. Under some circumstances joinder of offenses may accrue to a defendant's advantage. As two commentators have pointed
out: "Being called upon to defend himself in anumber of trials may be harrassing to a defendant and be
a disadvantage far outweighing the prejudice which
may result from a joinder. It is possible for the prosecutor to withhold some of the charges and file them
as detainers, thus making it difficult for defendant to
get parole." Remington & Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender,
1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 538-39. Furthermore, joinder of offenses may result in concurrent sentences.
Orfield, A Note on joinder of Offenses, 41 Ore. L.
Rev. 128, 130 (1962). If the prosecutor obtains separate indictments in order: to try a defendant several
times for related offenses, the defendant may move to
consolidate under Rule 13. Moreover, the prosecutor
runs the risk that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
may preclude a second trial if the defendant is acquitted at the first trial. See generally, Katz, Double
Jeopardy, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (July-August 1979).
In Drew v. U.S., 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. 1964), the court
-·outlined how a defendant could be prejudiced by the

See also U.S. v. Piacente, 490 F .2d 661, 662 (7th Cir.
1973); People v. Edwards, 63 111.2d 134,345 N.E.2d
496 (1976).
A second type of prejudice involves the possibility
that the jury will convict because the defendant possesses a criminal disposition. Shielding the defendant
from this possibility underlies the rule, long recognized
in Ohio, that the state may not introduce evidence of
the defendant's bad character or reputation unless the
defendant first introduces evidence of his good character. See State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 402, 358
N.E.2d 623,630 (1976); State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio
St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949). Even if evidence of a
defendant's bad character is not introduced, the jury
may nonetheless infer a bad character or criminal disposition because multiple offenses are tried together.
Severance, however, may not obviate this problem because even if the offenses are tried separately, the
state may be permitted to introduce evidence of the
severed offenses under the Similar Acts statute. R .C.
2945.59. In this event, the defendant would still face
the risk that the jury would improperly infer criminal
disposition. See State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132,
366 N.E.2d 1367 (1975). It should be noted, how3

ever, that the joinder requirements of Rule 8(A} are
broader than the admissibility requirements of the
Similar Acts statute; in many cases evidence of other
crimes would not be admissible in a separate trial. See
U.S. v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976) (similar
acts rule not applicable; severance required because inference of criminal disposition was prejudicial). For a
discussion of the Similar Acts statute, see Giannelli,
Character Evidence, 2 Public Defender Rptr. (MarchApril1979).
Joinder of offenses is also prejudicial if the jury cumulates the evidence. "We all know that, if you can
pile up a number of charges against a man, it is quite
often the case that the jury will convict, where, if they
were listening to the evidence on one charge only, they
would find it wholly insufficient .... " Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 23
Ore. L. Rev. 56, 58-59 (1943). Gregory v. U.S., 369
F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), exemplifies this point. In
reversing the defendant's conviction, the court commented: "The point is that a severance should have
been granted because ... the joinder was prejudicial
under Rule 14 .... Here there was not only the danger of the evidence with respect to the two robberies
cumulating in the jurors' minds tending to prove the
defendant guilty of each, but the evidence as to one of
the robberies was so weak as to lead one to question its
sufficiency to go to the jury. Thus its primary usefulness in this trial was to support the Government's case
as to the robbery which resulted in the murder." /d.
at 189. See also U.S. v. Carter, 475 F .2d 349 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); State v. Jonas, 363 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn.
1975).

meaning of the term prejudice in this context involves
a number of different factors, some of which are examined in the following sections.
Confessions of Codefendants
The admission in a joint trial of a codefendant's
confession which implicates the accused is an example
of prejudice under Rule 14. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court has decided several cases involving this issue on
Sixth Amendment grounds, the nonconstitutional analysis of Rule 14 prejudice has been overshadowed. In
Delli Paoli v. U.S., 352 U.S. 232 (1957), the Court upheld the practice of introducing a codefendant's confession in a joint trial because the Court was willing to
assume that the jury would follow the trial court's instruction to consider the confession only in deciding
the guilt of the codefendant. By 1968 the Court was
no longer willing to subscribe to this assumption. In
Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court wrote:
"[T] here are some contexts in which the risk that the
jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so
great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored .... Such a context
is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands
accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial." /d. at·13536. Once the Court concluded that there existed a
"substantial risk that the jury, despite the cautionary
instruction to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining the petitioner's guilt," it ruled that the defendant had been denied
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because
his right to cross-examine the codefendant about the
statement had been foreclosed. Subsequently, the
Court held Bruton applicable in state trials, Roberts
v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), and subject to the
harmless error doctrine, Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 ( 1969). Ohio cases discussing Bruton include
State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.2d 167, 255 N.E.2d 861
(1970); State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 123 n.
1, 247 N.E.2d 482, 483 n.1 (1969).
The simplest way to avoid the Bruton problem is
for the prosecutor to try the defendants separately or
to refrain from offering the codefendant's statement
in evidence. Bruton, however, can be avoided in several other ways. First, redaction or deletion of all references to the defendant which appear in the codefendant's statement would satisfy Bruton. While the
Bruton majority acknowledged this possibility in a
footnote, the acknowledgment could be characterized
as unenthusiastic because in the same footnote the
Court cited authorities "suggesting that deletions (redaction) from the confession are ineffective .... "
391 U.S. at 134 n.1 0. In his dissent, Justice White elaborated on the pitfalls of this procedure: "Effective
deletion will probably require not only omission of all
direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but
also of any statement that could be employed against
those defendants once their identity is otherwise established. Of course, the deletion must not be such that
it will distort the statements to the substantial prejudice of either the declarant or the government." !d.
at 143. The ABA CriminaiJustice Standards also com-

JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF DEFENDANTS
Rule 8(B) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same
information or complaint if they are alleged
to have participated in the same act or transaction or in
the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses, or in the same course of criminal conduct! Such defendants may be charged in one or more
counts together or separately and all of the defendants
need not be charged in each count.
indictm~nt,

Section 8(B) differs from section 8(A) in one important respect. Section (A) permits the joinder of offenses that"are of the same or similar character." A
comparable provision relating to the joinder of defendants does not appear in section (B); defendants may
be tried together only if they are alleged to have participated in the same acts or transactions or in the
same course of criminal conduct. Moreover, sections
(A) and (B) operate independently of each other.
Thus, if X has committed one robbery by himself and
a second robbery withY, all charges cannot be tried
at one time because Y did not participate in the first
robbery. The prosecutor could try X alone for both
robberies by' joining offenses under section (A), in
which case Y would .be tried separately for the second
robbery. Alternatively, X and Y could be tried jointly
under section (B) for the second robbery, in which
case X would be tried alone for the first robbery.
If codefendants are properly joined pursuant to
Rule 8(B), severance may nevertheless be required under Rule 14, provided prejudice is established. The
4

ment on these problems: "There are, of course, instances in which such editing is not possible; the references to the codefendant may be so frequent or so
closely interrelated with references to the maker's con;2\'J duct that little would be left of the statement after ed·-· iting." ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 38 (1968).
Second, the Bruton problem can be avoided at
feast in some instances, if the codefendant testlfies at
trial. Under these circumstances the defendant would
have the opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant on the accuracy of the out-of-court statement,
thereby removing the confrontation issue. The Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v. O'Neill,
402 U.S. 622 (1971 ): "We conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies
making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating
the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the
defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments." /d. at 629-30. See also State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E.2d
960 (1978). Eliminating tfie Bruton problem in this
way, however, is of little help to the prosecutor at the
time a motion to sever is made because the prosecutor
has no way of knowing or discovering whether the codefendant will waive his Fifth Amendment right and
testify at trial. Furthermore, the Nelson rationale
would be inapplicable if both defendants were represented by the same attorney because cross-examination
of the testifying codefendant would present a conflict
of interest. See Courtney v. U.S., 486 F .2d 1108 (9th
-~ Cir. 1973); Hofland v. Henderson, 460 F .2d 978 (5th
Cir. 1972); Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
Third, some courts have held that Bruton does not
apply when both defendants have confessed, implicating each other. See Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970).
The Supreme Court considered, but did not resolve,
the issue in Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
The plurality opinion in Parker took the position that
--Bruton was not applicable to cases involving interlocking confessions. Justice Stevens, joined by two other
Justices, dissented. The dissenting opinion criticized
two assumptions which supported the plurality opinion.
"First, [the plurality opinion] assumes that the
jury's ability to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible
and highly prejudicial confession is invariably increased by the existence of a corroborating statement by
the defendant. Second, it assumes that all unchallenged confessions by a defendant are equally reliable." /d.
at 2145. Justice Powell did not participate in the de- ~ision, and Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the
JUdgment on harmless error grounds, disagreed with
the plurality's position. Thus, there exists a 4-4 split
on this issue with Justice Powell's position unknown.
The Sixth Circuit, however, has taken the position that
-~·the Bruton rule applies to interlocking confessions.
See Hodges v. Rose, 570 F .2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978); ac.:cord, U.S. v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
Finally, the codefendant's confession in Bruton was
inadmissible against the accused under the hear-

say rule. If the codefendant's statement fell within
the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the
Bruton problem would apparently be obviated; in a
footnote in Bruton, the Court stated: "We emphasize
that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was
clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules
of evidence ... There is not before us, therefore, any
recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever
that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under
the Confrontation Clause." 391 U.S. at 128 n.3. In
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 ( 1970), the Court examined the confrontation problems associated with the coconspirator exception. Although the Court upheld a
liberal interpretation of the coconspirator exception in
Dutton, the Court did not take the position that statements falling within that exception automatically pass
constitutional muster. Instead the Court scrutinized
the statement to determine whether it possessed sufficient "indicia of reliability." This is consistent with
the Court's approach in other cases. See California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) ("[I] ndeed, we
have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were
admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception."). Thus, the availability of the coconspirator exception may remove the Bruton issue, but it would
not necessarily dispose of all confrontation issues.
State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339,86 N.E.2d 24
(1949), decided by the Ohio Supreme Court prior to
Bruton, should also be noted. In Rosen, the Court reversed a conviction because a codefendant's confession
was admitted during a joint trial. The Court commented: "The fact must be recognized ... that in many
cases the admission of such ex parte statements creates
impressions so adverse that they may not be eradicated
from the minds of the members of the jury. The prejudicial matter should be striken out or deleted before
the confession is admitted in evidence." /d. at 342;
86 N.E.2d at 26. Rosen is significant because the Ohio
Supreme Court did not rely on the confrontation
clause as was the case in Bruton; instead, the Court
was construing a joinder statute which was a forerunner of Rule 14. Thus, even if an appellate court should
find that confrontation guarantees have not been violated, either because the codefendant testified or because interlocking confessions were introduced, the
prejudicial impact of the statement on the minds of
the jury may require reversal. See also State v. Shafer
71 Ohio App. 1, 47 N.E.2d 669 (1942).
'
One other procedural point deserves attention.
Rule 14 requires the court, in ruling on a motion for
severance, to "order the prosecuting attorney to deliver to the court for inspection pursuant to Rule 16(B)
(1) (a) any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the state intends to introduce in evidence at trial."
Antagonistic Defenses
" [I] t has long been the view that defendants joined
for trial should be granted a severance whenever their
defenses are antagonistic to each other." ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 41 ( 1968).
The problem presented by antagonistic defenses is if-

I;
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that the codefendant would testify in his behalf. The
trial court denied the motion; the Seventh Circuit reversed. Under the circumstances of that case, the
court found that (1) the trial court could have ordered the codefendant tried first, and (2) Echeles "should
not be foreclosed of the possibility that [the codefendant] would testify in his behalf ... " merely because
the codefendant might claim his Fifth Amendment
privilege even if separate trials were ordered. /d. at
898.
A mere allegation that the defendant contemplates
calling a codefendant is insufficient. This has been
the holding in the federal cases as well as in State v.
Perod, 15 Ohio App.2d 115, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968).
Thus, counsel should disclose the exculpatory effect
of the codefendant's anticipated testimony as well as
the basis for believing why the codefendant would testify if severance is granted.
Support for the Echeles rule is found in U.S. v. Martinez 486 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Shuford,
454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971 ); Byrd v. Wainwright,
428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); U.S. v. Gay, 567 F.2d
916,921 (9th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Gleason, 259 F.
Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

lustrated by Deluna v. U.S., 308 F .2d 140 (5th Cir.
1962), in which two defendants were tried jointly for
narcotics offenses. One of the defendants, Gomez,
moved for severance prior to trial, but the motion
was denied. Although the second defendant, Deluna,
did not testify at trial, Gomez took the stand and
blamed Deluna for the offense. In closing argument,
Gomez' counsel commented that "at least one man
was honest enough and had courage enough to take
the stand and subject himself to cross-examination ..
. You haven't heard a. word from [Deluna]." /d. at
143. This tactic apparently worked-Gomez was acquitted, Deluna convicted. On appeal the Fifth-Circuit reversed Deluna's conviction. The court believed
that Gomez' attorney had acted properly; "his attorneys should be free to draw all rational inferences
from the failure of a codefendant to testify, just as an
attorney is free to comment on the effect of any interested party's failure to produce materia_! evidence in
his possession or to call Vl{itnesses who have knowledge
of pertinent facts." /d. Nevertheless, from Deluna's
perspective, the comments prejudiced the exercise of
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. This conflict could have been avoided; the court noted, "for
each of the defendants to see the face of Justice they
must be tried separately." /d. at 155.
One Ohio appellate court has recognized this problem. In State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 247
N.E.2d 482 (1969), the court observed: "[I] tis easy
to imagine further complications in a consolidated trial. For example, suppose one defendant takes the
stand and the other does not. Is the failure to testify
subject to comment by the lawyer for the testifying
codefendant?" /d. at 124 n.2, 247 N.E.2d at 483 n.2.
Although the court did not have to answer this question to decide that case, it did give some inkling as to
how it would have decided the issue when it stated:
"This court unanimously disapproves the consolidation as not consonant with good practice in criminal
trials .... " /d. at 123, 247 N.E.2d at 483.
Other examples of reversals of joint trials because
of antagonistic defenses include People v. Hurst, 396
Mich. 1, 9, 238 N.W.2d 6, 10 (1976) (joint trial improper because one defendant "would testify to exculpate herself and incriminate [the other] "); Murray v.
State, 528 P.2d 739, 740 (Okla. Cr. 1974) ("Denial of
a severance in the instant case resulted in pitting defendant against co-defendant."); People v. Braune,363
Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1936) ("Any set of
circumstances which is sufficient to deprive a defendant of a fair trial if tried jointly with another is sufficient to require a separate trial."). See also Anno., 70
A. L. R. 1171 , 11 84-85 ( 1931 ) .

Guilt by Association
In some cases the accumulation of evidence against
one defendant may spill over on other defendants, resulting in a conviction of the latter even though the evidence against that defendant is weak or marginal-in
short, guilt by association. In United States v. Kelly,
349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1965),cert. denied, 384 U.S.
94 7 ( 1966), the Second Circuit reversed a conviction
on this ground, commenting that severance should
have been granted "the moment it appeared that [the
defendant] was likely to be prejudiced by the accumulation of evidence of wrongdoing by his codefendant."
/d. at 756 (citing Fed~ R. Crim. P. 14).
Kelly was followed in U.S. v. Mardian, 546 F .2d
973 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Mardian, one of the Watergate
defendants, was tried along with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell. His alleged participation in the
Watergate coverup was minor compared to that of the
more well-known codefendants. On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit reversed because Mardian's motion to sever
was not granted during trial. The court commented:
"Particularly where there is a great disparity in the
weight of the evidence, strongly establishing the guilt
of some defendants, the danger persists that guilt will
improperly 'rub off' on the others." /d. at 977.
Complexity
Where the number of charges and defendants is so
numerous that the jury will be incapable of distinguishing the evidence and applying the law to each defendant separately, a severance should be granted. This
problem is illustrated by U.S. v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D.
262 (W.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the trial court granted
a severance, stating: "The complex involvement of
the various defendants and the multiplicity of charges
contained in the indictment would render it difficult,
if not impossible, for the court to adequately charge a
jury as to the applicable law with respect to each de- fendant and for the jury to apply that law intelligently

Codefendant's Exculpatory Testimony
In some cases defendants have been prejudiced because a joint trial precluded them from calling codefendants who could have provided exculpatory evidence. The leading case is U.S. v. Echeles, 352 F .2d
892 (7th Cir. 1965), in which the defendant was charged with suborning perjury, impeding the administration of justice, and conspiracy. Echeles' codefendant
had previously testified in another trial that Echeles
was not involved in the events upon which the present
charges were based. Echeles moved for a severance so
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in reaching verdicts on the many charges involved." /d.
at 263. For an Ohio case which reversed a defendant's
conviction on this ground, see City of Cincinnati v.
Reichman, 27 Ohio App.2d 125, 272 N.E.2d 904
~ (1971 ).
Capital Offenses
In contrast to its federal counterpart, Ohio.Rule 14
contains a provision specifically covering severance in
capital cases: "When two or more persons are jointly
indicted for a capital offense, each of such persons
shall be tried separately, unless the court orders the defendants to be tried jointly, upon application by the
prosecuting attorney or one or more of the defendants,
and for good cause shown." In effect, this provision
presumes prejudice in joint trials of capital offenses.
This provision follows R.C. 2945.20 and thus, cases
interpreting that provision are still persuasive authority.
The burden of establishing good cause for a joint trial
in a capital case rests on the prosecutor. See State v.
Abbott, 152 Ohio St. 228, 89 N.E.2d 147 (1949);
State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154,279 N.E.2d
(1971 ).
In establishing good cause, the Ohio Supreme Court
has stated: "[G] ood cause must necessarily be some
operative factor not present in every case of joint indictments of defendants in capital cases. For instance,
the additional time and labor required of the state or
court, or the expense to the state, made necessary by
separate trials, cannot be assigned or considered as good
cause." State v. Abbott, 152 Ohio St. 228, 236, 89
N.E.2d 147, 151 ( 1949). See also State v. Dingledine,
28 Ohio L. Abs. 685, 687-88, 33 N.E.2d 660, 662-63
(Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 251,20
N.E.2d 6367 (1939) (crowded dockets insufficient to
establish good cause.). Administrative and economic
reasons for a joint trial were also rejected in State v.
Richardson, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 608, 54 N.E.2d 160 (Ct.
App. 1943). The court went on to hold, however,
that joinder was proper under the circumstances of
that case because it "enable[d] the jury to have a
clearer insight into the testimony and enable[d] it to
arrive more intelligently at a proper conclusion." /d.
at 613, 54 N.E.2d at 162. See also State v. Jenkins,
76 Ohio App. 277, 64 N.E.2d 86, appeal dismissed,
144 Ohio St. 638,60 N.E.2d 182 (1945). In Gregory
v. U.S., 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), however, the
court observed: "It may be seriously questioned
whether it is proper in any capital case to join for trial
offenses occurring at different times and places. The
danger arising from the cumulative effect of other offenses on the minds of the jurors is too great to tolerate in such cases." /d. at 189. Similarly, the danger
of prejudice arising from a joinder of defendants may
also be "too great to tolerate" in capital cases.
Failure to object to joinder in capital cases may
constitute a waiver. See State v. Williams, 85 Ohio
App. 236,88 N.E.2d 20 (1947); State v. Bohannon,
64 Ohio App. 431,28 N.E.2d 1010 (1940).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Prior Convictions of Government Witnesses
A prior conviction with which a prosecution witness might be impeached must be supplied to a criminal defendant upon request, according to the D.C.
Circuit. The Court found that the "premises" of
Brady v. Maryland, 393 U.S. 83 (1963), and U.S. v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), require the government to
produce upon request evidence material to the outcome of the case. In light of the difficulty of showing
how impeachment evidence may be material to the
guilt or innocence of the particular defendant, the
Court applied a per se rule dispensing with a showing
of materiality in each case. The Court stated: "[T] he
integrity of the criminal trial process requires uniformity of access to impeachable convictions of government witnesses when requested." Lewis v. U.S., 25
Crim. L. Rptr. 2032 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
Stop and Frisk
The Eighth Circuit held that the random pedestrian
stop of the defendant Vl(hich turned up a concealed
handgun was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. The police officer had been ordered to intensify his evening patrol because of racially-motivated
gang fights in the neighborhood during the day, and
did so by means of "field interviews" of random pedestrians. During one such stop, the weapon was discovered. Citing Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391
(1979), and Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979),
the Court held that "generalized racial unrest cannot
obviate the requirement that law officers 'have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the
individual [seized] is involved in criminal activity.'"
U.S. v. Palmer, 25 Crim. L. Rptr. 2455 (8th Cir. 1979).
Plea Negotiations
When plea negotiations in an assault case were unsuccessful, the defendant was reindicted for assault
with intent to kill while armed. The D.C. Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction, citing North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), for the rule that due process forbids a defendant from being forced to waive
his rights out of fear of a harsher penalty due to prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Court minimized the importance of Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978), which had allowed the addition of a more serious charge upon the defendant's failure to plead guilty. Washington v. U.S., 25 Cr. L. Rptr. 2499 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1979).
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Impoundment of Automobiles
The Court held that an automobile may not be im7

pounded by police when other alternatives, such as
entrusting it to the driver's companion or locking it in
a safe place, are available. The conviction had been
based upon an inventory search of the impounded auto after the driver was stopped for drunk driving. The
Court rejected prosecution arguments that the defendant's intoxication made him per se incompetent to entrust the auto to his sober passenger, since "it is the degree of the driver's intoxication that should be determinative of this issue." The State's failure affirmatively to show such incompetence invalidated the search.
Drinkard v. State, 25 Cr. L. Rptr. 2477 (Tenn. Sup.
Ct. 1979).

Telephonic Warrant
The Sixth Circuit held that a magistrate's faiiure to
place under oath an FBI agent seeking a telephonic
warrant prior to taking his testimony, rendered the
warrant invalid. Although the agent was sworn at
some point during the conversation, the Court held
that such an oath cannot be considered "to relate
back to the testimony already supplied." The strict
reading of the rule was based upon the clear Congressional purpose "to impress on the telephone caller the
solemnity of the proceeding in spite of the lack of formal appearance before a court." U.S. v. Shorter, 25
Grim. L. Rptr. 2356 (6th Cir. 1979).

General Search
Pursuant to a warrant, F.B.I. agents entered and
searched defendant's offices for stolen files and documents. The agents seized several hundred documents,
far more than the 148 specifically described in the warrant. Many of the documents seized were admittedly
"innocuous" and nearly half could "by no stretch of
the imagination" be regarded as within the warrant's
designated categories of documents to be seized. The
Court found the mere return of non-incriminating items to be an 'inadequate remedy. Consequently, the
Court held that the warrant was improperly executed
and suppressed all seized evidence as the fruit of an impermissible general search. In reSearch Warrant
(Church of Scientology), 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2525 (U.S.
Dist. Ct., D.C. 1979).

Parental Consent to Search
The Court held that the warrantless search by police of the bedroom of a 17 year old youth violated
his privilege against unreasonable search and seizure,
although a parent had consented to the search. The
decision was based strictly upon the State Constitution, but referred to U.S. Supreme Court language to
support its holding .. Noting the decreasing importance
of parental consent in the areas of abortion and treatment of mental disorders, the Court stated, "it would
be incongruous to conclude that parents, for good reason or no reason, may summarily waive their child's
right to search and seizure protections." In re Scott,
25 Grim. L. Rptr. 1043 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979).

Improper Comment-Harmless Error
The Sixth Circuit discussed the requirements of the
harmless error rule in the context of a prosecutor's
comment on the defendant's failure to testify. According to the Court, several factors are relevant: the extent of the prosecutor's improper comments, the
strength of the case against the defendant, the efficacy
of corrective jury instructions, and the number of other
errors at trial. Although the State had a strong case against the defendant, the eyidence was not overwhelming nor undisputed. In light of other errors and the
trial court's failure to give a curative instruction, the
prosecutor's comment was deemed prejudicial error,
and the defendant's convktion was reversed. Eberhardt
v. Bordenkircher, 26 Grim. L. Rptr. 2036 (6th Cir.
1979).

Impeachment Exception
Subsequent to his arrest for armed robbery, police
elicited incriminating evidence from the defendant in
violation of his Miranda rights. In a pretrial hearing
the trial court ruled that the defendant's statement
could be used to impeach him on cross-examination,
even though his dires::t testimony did not refer to the
statement. The First Circuit reversed the conviction,
even though the trial court's ruling had been made in
advance and the defendant consequently never took
the stand. Said the Court, "A concrete issue existed
at the time the rulin~ was made and, in our view, is
no less present now because the immediate resolution of that issue caused [the defendant] not to testify." U.S. v. Hickey, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2178 (1st Cir.
1979).

Reporter's Notes
On First Amendment grounds, the Court denied
the ..defendants' subpoena for materials gathered by a
reporter for use in a book. The defendants claimed
that the materials would yield information about two
F.B.I. searches of their premises. Relying on the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court applied a balancing test to find the materials privileged: "the reporter is protected from the subpoena power of a criminal
defendant unless the information is necessary to a fair
hearing and there are no alternative avenues for access
to the information in the reporter's possession." U.S.
v. Hubbard, 26 Grim. L. Rptr. 2030 (U.S. Dist. Ct.,
D.C. 1979).

Security Guard Interrogation
The New York Court of Appeals held that Miranda
warnings must be given to a suspect being questioned
by private store detectives under certain circumstances. The. Court held that extensive police involvement in a suspect's arrest may create a custodial atmosphere, although the actual questioning is done by
private security guards. In a case where police officers actively participated in the arrest, identifying
themselves to the suspect as police officers and escorting the suspect to the interrogation room, Miranda
warnings were necessary. People v. jones, 25 Grim. L.
Rptr. 2384 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).
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